A condensed English rendering by Türkmen Post of Hugo Dixon’s Reuters Breakingviews article, “Mark Carney shows way to build better world order,” preserving the original argument and narrative approach.

When Mark Carney addressed the European Parliament last week, he did not mention Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping. Yet all three cast a shadow over the chamber. That reality lies behind the new partnership being developed by the Canadian prime minister and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen: Ottawa and Brussels recognise that each is more vulnerable when confronting pressure from major powers alone.

The proposed Canada–European Union “alliance for the future” should not be viewed merely as a new bilateral partnership. If designed properly, it could become the starting point for a wider model open to the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia and, over time, other middle powers.

Its purpose should not be another conventional free-trade agreement. The central issue is security in its broadest sense, extending from energy and weapons to technology and artificial intelligence. Reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening resilience are becoming more important than simply lowering tariffs. Doing so will require substantial public and private investment in joint projects.

“Resilience” was the most prominent idea in Carney’s speech. Canada and the EU each have gaps in their strategic capabilities. If they can compensate for one another’s weaknesses, it will become harder for powerful states to exploit them.

Critical minerals, defence-industrial capacity, artificial intelligence and computing power, energy security, space communications and payment systems are among the leading vulnerabilities. They are also areas in which China, the United States or Russia can turn their advantages into instruments of pressure. China has used its dominance in critical minerals, Russia was able for years to exert leverage over Europe through natural gas, and Washington’s weight within NATO gives it an exceptionally strong position in its dealings with Europe.

Canada could fill some of Europe’s gaps. It could become a trusted source of critical minerals for the EU. New port infrastructure capable of exporting liquefied natural gas through the Arctic and Atlantic could also contribute to European energy security.

Deeper links between financial-services markets could reduce the pressure Washington can exert through its dominance of the global financial system. Canada and Europe could pool computing resources, build new transatlantic digital links, work together on safer artificial intelligence and direct scientists towards joint projects in advanced technologies.

Greater youth mobility, student exchanges and digital trade could form further parts of the relationship. There are, however, clear limits. Canada and the EU already have an extensive free-trade agreement, and even that has not been fully ratified. Going much further could require Canada to move closer to the EU single market, at the cost of becoming a country that applies rules written in Brussels.

Geography cannot be changed either. The United States accounted for 59% of Canada’s goods trade last year, compared with only 9% for the EU. However troubling Trump’s tariffs and remarks about Canada may be, the United States will remain Canada’s most important economic partner.

For that reason, von der Leyen’s description of the developing relationship as a form of “associate membership” was unfortunate. It risked portraying Canada as a second-class satellite of the EU. Some EU member states were also sceptical of the phrase.

The underlying idea, however, is much bigger than Canada.

The more middle powers exposed to pressure from major states work together, the greater their collective weight becomes. According to International Monetary Fund data, major economies excluding the United States, China and Russia will account for roughly 49% of total G20 output this year. It therefore makes sense for the Canada–EU partnership to remain open to others.

An alliance of middle powers could be grounded in the central principle of the United Nations Charter: states should neither invade nor threaten one another. In theory, this principle might appeal even to some authoritarian states. In practice, it would be more realistic to begin with countries that share broadly similar values and interests.

Australia has already expressed interest. The United Kingdom could be a natural partner if it moves beyond its post-Brexit trauma. A structure centred on security in this wider sense might even offer Britain a path towards closer ties with the EU. It could provide concrete benefits for Ukraine and connect with von der Leyen’s proposal for a European Security Council bringing together the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, Ukraine and Norway. Japan and other countries could be considered over time.

Trump’s shadow nevertheless hangs over the entire project. Europe still relies on American military support to confront Russia. Von der Leyen was therefore right to stress that the proposed alliance with Canada is “not against someone else” but intended to strengthen shared power. There is no guarantee that Trump will see it in the same way.

Even so, Europe has the economic scale to deter Russia without the United States if it increases its defence capacity sufficiently. The combined output of the EU, the United Kingdom and Norway this year is about 11 times that of Russia. Japan faces a more difficult equation because China’s economy is approximately 4.8 times larger than its own.

All of this shows that middle powers do not have to act alone. At a time when major states are turning the world into an arena for their rivalry, the model Canada and Europe are trying to build could open a different path: a broader partnership of countries that reduce one another’s vulnerabilities, strengthen their security and convert their combined economic weight into political influence.

That, in essence, is the direction Carney and von der Leyen are trying to show.

This text is a shortened English rendering of the original article. The views and assessments belong to the article’s author.

Author: Hugo Dixon
Publication: Reuters Breakingviews
Date: September 21, 2026